Category Archives: Argumentation
Claire Polo Christian Plantin Kristine Lund Gerald Niccolai (2013) Quand construire une position émotionnelle, c’est choisir une conclusion argumentative : le cas d’un café-débat sur l’eau potable au Mexique
Éliminer, maintenir, renforcer les désaccords
Résumé : Le traitement adéquat de la différence d’opinion est une question disputée en théorie de l’argumentation, où la tendance dominante est orientée vers la réduction du désaccord. Les § 1 à 3 récapitulent les éléments qui fondent cette vision : principe de coopération, préférence pour l’accord, suite préférée, politesse linguistique (§1). théories orientées vers la réduction du dissensus, par la persuasion rhétorique (§2) ou par l’élimination dialectique (§3). Polémique et controverse ne peuvent dès lors être vues que comme des fallacies ou des péchés de langue, où se manifestent l’échec et le malheur de l’argumentation, incitant à substituer aux règles de discussion des règles de raisonnement, ad directionem ingenii (§4).
En référence au statut interactionnel de l’argumentation (§5) les §6 et §7 proposent une vision de l’argumentation agnostique du point de vue des orientations vers l’accord ou le désaccord. On appellera fallacie du consensus la tendance à ériger en absolu l’exigence de consensus. A la suite de Hamblin, on retirera au « logicien » l’arbitrage des disputes, pour le remettre là où il a toujours été de fait, entre les mains des disputants. Cette perspective émique sur les règles de la controverse conduit à s’intéresser en priorité aux règles qui fonctionnent effectivement sur les sites argumentatifs les plus variés (§8). La conclusion (§9) porte sur la banalité du désaccord radical.
Mots clés : Argumentation, interactions, désaccord, évaluation, règles du débat
Abstract : Eliminating, maintaining, strengthening differences of opinion
Mainstream argumentation theories are oriented towards the elimination of disagreement. §1 sums up three principles building up consensus in conversation: cooperation principle, preference for agreement in second turns in conversation, linguistic politeness. Rhetorical approaches to argument aims at eliminating dissensus (doubt of the audience and counter-discourse of the other orator) through persuading the audience (§2). Dialectical approaches aims at the same result through the elimination one of the two conflicting point of views (§3). As a result, maintaining dissensus and controversies is dubbed as irrational; dissensus is stigmatized as fallacious or irrational, sinful in the language of the medieval theory of the “sins of the tongue” (§4 and 5).
Starting from the an interactional, and more generally dialogical approach to argument, paragraphs 6 and 7 outline some reasons to remain agnostic about the question of consensus and dissensus. The (argumentative) question if a difference of opinion should be eliminated or promoted is entirely open; the will to eliminate dissensus as an aberration on a priori grounds, will be dubbed “the fallacy of consensus”. Following Hamblin for whom the logician is, “at best a trained advocate” (1970, p. 244-245) — and not the “terminator” of all and any argument, we argue first that evaluation is one of the participants’ task, and second that argumentation scholars should devote more attention to specific systems or rules as they are defined and implemented on specific settings. “Deep” and persisting disagreement is not an existential tragedy for the arguers but a basic characteristic of their condition.
Key words Argumentation, interaction, disagreement, evaluation, rules of debate
Argumentation in the Knowledge Society
Abstract : Knowledge society can be characterized as a society where the classical instruments of rhetoric, doxa-based substantial knowledge and topical inference rules, are constantly thwarted by scientific knowledge, calculus and method. In such a context, argument cannot be construed as antagonistic to demonstration and restricted to a purely linguistic inference or to as an “artistic” rhetorical prowess.
A strong research community nowadays focuses on argumentation as a tool for knowledge acquisition and knowledge-based social decision making (ex: “Bees exposed to high levels of pesticides suspected in colony collapse”). A concept of argument is needed which could be used to build bridge between the « two cultures”. To take a step in that direction, the form and substance of the argumentative dialog have to be reconsidered. First, the kind of dialogue appropriate to knowledge building is not formal dialog but substantial dialog, the “default-reasoning dialog”; Toulmin’s scheme can be read as such a reasoning dialog. Second, a core set of « knowledge-based » arguments (arguments connecting objects) can be delimited. This may suggest that we are not jailed in a maybe comfortable but finally sterile opposition between “those who prove” and “those who (at their best) argue”.
Key words : argumentation, rhetoric, proof, demonstration, socio-scientific issues, science education, debate
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